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Abstract 
This study examined the effect of accurate feedback and biased feedback (inflated 
and deflated), in the form of marks, on the accuracy of item-by-item and global 
judgments of learning (JOL). 80 participants (49 females, Mage = 29.61, SD = 12.76) 
were randomly allocated into one of four conditions: no feedback, accurate feedback, 
inflated feedback and deflated feedback. Using a computer program, participants 
studied 50 Swahili-English word-pairs, and judged the likelihood of remembering 
each item (item-by-item JOL) and the overall percentage of likely remembered word-
pairs after each learning session (global JOL). Immediately after each learning 
session, a testing session was held. The accurate feedback group received accurate 
marks after the first and second testing session. The inflated feedback group received 
marks increased by 32 percent; the deflated feedback group – marks decreased by 32 
percent. There were three study-test phases. Feedback did not affect item-by-item 
JOL accuracy. Deflated feedback significantly reduced global JOL accuracy with a 
large effect size (d = 1.16), suggesting that participants are sensitive to deflated 
feedback, which can potentially affect their theory-based cues about their ability to 
learn. 
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This research project investigated the effects of feedback on metacognition – 
the ability to judge one’s own knowledge. This self-knowledge can be understood as 
higher order thinking, where the subject of this mental process is itself performing 
the thinking. Metacognition is widely considered a critical skill in educational 
settings (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2008; Metcalfe, 2009, 2017; Nelson, Dunlosky, 
Graf, & Narens, 1994) as metacognitive monitoring is thought to drive metacognitive 
control (e.g., the allocation of study time to items requiring further learning). Thus, 
effective monitoring is critical for effective behavioural regulation and, ultimately, 
learning (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2008). However, metacognitive knowledge is not 
uniform and does not yield homogenous effects on learning performance.  Rather, its 
benefits depend on monitoring accuracy (Rawson, O'Neil, & Dunlosky, 2011) which 
in turn depends, for example, on the characteristics of the subject being studied, the 
conditions of studying, and the mnemonic processes involved (Koriat, 1997). We 
investigated how metacognitive judgments are affected by assessment feedback, 
comparing the effects of accurate feedback, and positively or negatively biased 
feedback, on the accuracy of predictions in subsequent studying cycles, against a no-
feedback control condition.  
Development of Metacognitive Research 
 The first notions of a higher order cognition date back to Aristotle’s treatise 
On the Soul (trans. 1931) which stated that the mind itself can be an object of 
thinking in the same way as external objects. However, for radical behaviourists, 
prevalent in psychology in the middle of the last century, cognition was 
conceptualised as another kind of behaviour (Skinner, 1945) or as stimuli affecting 
behaviour (Razran, 1955). Therefore, cognition and metacognition became relevant 
in evidence-based psychology only when the behavioural approach started losing its 
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monopoly on rigorous quantitative research to the school of cognitive psychology 
(Staddon, 2014). 
The term metacognition came into use when Flavell (1971) presented the idea 
that children, as they develop, increase their ability to monitor their knowledge, 
which he called “metamemory”. Ultimately, Flavell (1976) conceptualised 
metamemory as a subtype of metacognition and defined metacognition as knowledge 
about one’s own cognitions, commonly referred to as thinking about thinking, of 
which metamemory is a specific example relating to knowledge of one’s own 
memory.  
Judgments of Learning 
A key measure of metamemory in comparatively recent studies has been 
judgments of learning (JOLs).  People make JOLs during or after a learning session 
by predicting the likelihood of future recall (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2008; Nelson & 
Narens, 1990). In a typical JOL study, participants study a list of word-pairs 
consisting of a cue and a target word, for example, FORK (cue) – SPOON (target). 
They then rate their probability of being able to recall the target when presented only 
with the cue. This rating is their JOL. The ratings can then be compared with actual 
recall performance in a subsequent test to assess the accuracy (or predictive validity) 
of JOLs.  
Researchers have conflicting views regarding the theoretical basis for JOLs. 
According to the early direct-access hypothesis, metacognitive monitoring judgments 
are made by directly accessing and indexing the strength of a target item in memory, 
e.g., through an attempt at retrieval (King, Zechmeister, & Shaughnessy, 1980; 
Koriat, 2000). Hence, the direct-access hypothesis is falsified when the outcome of 
memory monitoring diverges from the memory performance. This divergence has 
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been found in most JOL studies to date, which revealed that participants are not 
perfectly accurate when making JOLs (e.g. Koriat, Sheffer, & Ma'ayan, 2002). These 
studies revealed that although people can effectively monitor their learning, 
metacognitive judgments are vulnerable to systematic distortions. Therefore, it is 
possible to dissociate effects on metacognition from effects on memory performance. 
An explanation for the disparity between predictions and memory 
performance was proposed by Koriat’s (1997) cue-utilisation hypothesis. Koriat 
argued that when people produce JOLs they utilise simultaneously three types of 
cues: intrinsic, extrinsic, and mnemonic. According to this typology, intrinsic cues 
relate to the characteristics of a studied item (e.g., perceived difficulty). For example, 
closely associated word-pairs of high frequency, such as cat – milk, would cue low 
difficulty of learning whereas a distant association of low-frequency words, such as 
damsel – mitochondria, would indicate higher learning difficulty. Koriat proposed 
that the second class of cues – extrinsic – involves both the conditions of learning 
(e.g., the number of study trials) and the types of mental operations performed, (e.g., 
the degree of elaboration). According to the cue-utilisation approach, the analysis of 
both intrinsic and extrinsic cues can affect JOLs directly via a theory-based pathway. 
This pathway of judgment, according to Kelley and Jacoby (1996) relies on a pre-
existing collection of rules which are used in the judgement process. The analysis of 
the theory-based pathway is focused on specified factors, for example, the difficulty 
of the subject being studied (intrinsic cue), and the amount of time spent studying 
(extrinsic cue).   
Koriat (1997) proposed that people also use heuristics when making JOLs 
and that they use their past experience as a basis for these mental shortcuts. Koriat 
labelled this third class of cues mnemonic – intuitive judgments on the accessibility 
THE EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK    5 
 
 
 
of an item from memory. Koriat argued that mnemonic cues are not a mere reflection 
of memory tracing, but are also affected by intrinsic and extrinsic cues. Therefore, 
according to the cue-utilisation approach, JOLs are influenced by three streams of 
cues, where the mnemonic stream is partially fed by both intrinsic and extrinsic 
streams.  
This complex model seems to better explain disparities between JOLs and 
performance than the direct-access approach, because a biased judgment of any of 
the multiple variables on which JOLs are based may result in decreased accuracy. 
Therefore, the chance of a biased judgment is greater with a larger number of 
variables. One variable that has the potential to affect JOLs is feedback. Further, 
Koriat, Ma'ayan, and Nussinson (2006) explicitly argued that mnemonic cues are 
based on feedback on one’s previous behaviour. It is this notion that formed the basis 
for the current study. 
The abovementioned disparity between JOLs and performance can be 
investigated using the two most prominent measures for JOL accuracy: resolution 
and calibration (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977). Yaniv, Yates, and Smith (1991) 
explained resolution (or discrimination) as the ability to distinguish between two 
classes of items (e.g., items that will be recalled and those that will not). The larger 
the difference between JOLs for both class of items the better the resolution. In 
contrast, calibration measures the accuracy of probabilistic judgments (e.g., assessing 
the likelihood of future recall on a 0-100% scale) by calculating the correspondence 
between predictions and performance (Yaniv, Yates, & Smith, 1991). For example, 
in terms of the proportion of items recalled at each level of JOLs, of all items given 
80 percent JOLs, how many were actually recalled. If the number of recalled items 
(for 80 percent JOLs) is below 80 percent this inaccuracy is called overconfidence, if 
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it is exactly 80 percent (i.e., the objective and subjective probabilities of recall 
match) calibration is perfect, and when recall is above 80 percent then calibration 
shows underconfidence. Although both calibration and resolution measure JOL 
accuracy these measures are differently affected by learning. According to Koriat 
(1997), repeated practice impairs calibration but it also improves resolution.  
The impairment of JOL accuracy has been comprehensively researched in the 
context of the underconfidence with practice (UWP) effect. This phenomenon, 
described in detail by Koriat, Sheffer, and Ma'ayan (2002), can be observed when 
participants study the same items over a number of study-test phases. Calibration 
between participants’ JOLs and performance tends to show overconfidence after the 
first learning cycle (i.e., JOLs overestimate actual recall performance), but 
underconfidence in the following cycles (i.e., JOLs underestimate actual recall 
performance). In the present study, we were interested in the effects of repeated 
learning on JOLs when learners receive assessments – settings typical for education. 
The Interplay of Metacognition and Feedback in Education 
 The effects of feedback on metacognition have been extensively investigated 
in the context of education (Butler & Winne, 1995; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2008; 
Dunlosky & Rawson, 2012; Hattie & Timperley, 2007). These effects vary according 
to the type, timing, and source of feedback, as well as other conditions including, for 
example, the ability to interpret feedback (Hacker, Bol, Horgan, & Rakow, 2000). 
Thus, the ability to reflect on one’s state of knowledge is a pivotal part of a 
successful learning process. There is also considerable research supporting the notion 
that feedback is the foundation of metacognitive beliefs (Butler, Karpicke, & 
Roediger III, 2008; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2008; Hattie & Timperley, 2007). Hence, 
the accuracy of metacognitive predictions is, at least partially, a function of accurate 
THE EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK    7 
 
 
 
feedback. This accuracy can also be affected by external conditions, for example, the 
timing of the judgment (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991) and by cognitive variables, 
including the perceived difficulty of the information being studied (Thiede & 
Dunlosky, 1999). Ultimately, feedback plays a prominent role in forming 
metacognitive beliefs because it supports the monitoring of one’s knowledge. 
Metacognition is, according to Nelson and Narens (1990), a dynamic interplay 
between monitoring of learning and control over learning. In this interplay the 
accuracy and distortions of monitoring affect the quality of learning. Further, Thiede, 
Anderson, and Therriault (2003) and Thiede and Dunlosky (1999) highlighted the 
importance of monitoring and argued that a learner can optimally allocate their 
resources only when the monitoring is accurate. Dunlosky, Rawson, Marsh, Nathan, 
and Willingham (2013) explicitly argued that, in the context of practice testing – a 
highly effective learning method - feedback is an important monitoring tool.  
The effect of feedback on monitoring depends on the feedback type. For 
example, task-level feedback provides specific information about the performance of 
a particular task as opposed to general feedback, which provides summary 
information on student progress (Shute, 2008). Marks are a common example of 
general feedback, used at universities worldwide (Biggs, 1999; Sadler, 2005). This 
form of assessment feedback shows student performance on a task, often on a 100 
point scale.  
 Shute (2008) reviewed the body of research on feedback and found that 
specific and timely feedback is generally more supportive of learning than general 
feedback, admitting however that the mechanism behind this phenomenon remains 
unclear. Kluger and DeNisi (1996) found a similar phenomenon in their meta-
analysis, although they too could not elucidate its basis. More recently, Goodman, 
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Wood, and Chen (2011), in an experiment comparing the effects of different levels of 
feedback on project management tasks, found that the more specific the feedback, 
the better the outcome of the learning. However, the transfer of this learning to other 
tasks is impaired when the feedback is highly specific. Moreover, Goodman et al. 
(2011) argued that feedback has negative effects on explicit information processing, 
such as planning and assessing actions. Therefore, highly specific feedback improves 
learning of a feedback-related task but decreases the transfer of learning to other 
tasks due to the decreased level of cognitive engagement. Lam, DeRue, Karam, and 
Hollenbeck (2011) also challenged the generality of the beneficial effect of feedback. 
They found that whilst feedback can improve learning performance, it can also 
decrease performance when provided with such high frequency as to overwhelm the 
cognitive capabilities of participants.  
According to Koriat (1997), feedback that relates specifically to item-by-item 
performance enhances the accuracy of metacognitive judgements. For example, 
feedback can alleviate the metacognitive distortion of the UWP effect. Koriat (1997) 
found that participants who received feedback in the first study-test cycle showed 
reduced underconfidence after subsequent study sessions when compared to 
participants who received no feedback. The feedback was presented in the form of a 
high-pitch sound when participants did not produce a correct answer. This effect was 
observable even though the intrinsic characteristics of the items (for example 
difficulty) and their extrinsic characteristics (for example study environment) were 
the same in both conditions. Koriat argued that feedback that provided additional 
indicators (i.e., mnemonic cues) enhanced calibration. These cues (in the form of 
feedback) signalled the probability of target recall to the participants. Therefore, 
Koriat’s experiment supported the view that feedback can improve metacognition. 
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However, feedback did not improve recall. This can be explained by the controlled 
setting of the experiment which allowed for monitoring of the learning progress (via 
feedback) but did not allow the control of behaviour (e.g., increasing study time for 
more difficult items).  
Different types of feedback, however, have varying effects on task 
performance and metacognition. The effect of item-by-item feedback on 
metacognition is complex and can be counterintuitive. Kornell and Rhodes (2013) 
showed that participants who received feedback after recalling a target word 
produced significantly less accurate JOLs than participants who did not receive 
feedback. The feedback was presented by showing the cue-target word-pair 
immediately after the recall. Therefore, this condition increased the exposure to the 
studied word-pairs, which was reflected in the significantly higher recall for this 
group. However, it seemed that participants did not fully acknowledge this additional 
study in their predictions because, in the group which received feedback, resolution 
was significantly lower than in the group with testing without feedback. Thus, in 
some cases, feedback does not improve metacognitive insight, which fits with the 
idea that participants do not recognise the value of additional learning opportunities 
in these multi-cycle paradigms.  
In regards to the effect of feedback in applied settings (i.e., marks), Crooks 
(1988) argued that specific feedback has a significantly higher positive effect on a 
student’s performance than general feedback. Butler’s (1988) findings went even 
further – that grades have a null effect on future performance. Butler investigated the 
effect of feedback in the context of student motivation and argued that the key to 
learning is intrinsic, task-oriented motivation, reflected by student engagement, 
which in turn supports performance. Butler hypothesised that feedback in the form of 
THE EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK    10 
 
 
 
grades initiates ego-involved motivation focused on the outcome of the external 
assessment. Butler argued that this ego-involved motivation undermines performance 
because it shifts student engagement from learning to the outcome of learning. Butler 
(1988) compared engagement and performance between students who received 
marks, comments, and both. Only task-specific comments supported learning; 
students who received marks did not make learning progress. Butler also found that 
the provision of marks, when accompanied by specific feedback, cancelled out the 
positive effects of specific feedback. Butler argued that mixing specific feedback and 
marking is as unhelpful in learning as marking alone because when students are 
presented with both forms of feedback they tend to ignore specific comments and 
focus on the marks. 
Other research suggested that the effect of summary feedback on 
metacognition is similarly negligible on metacognition as it is on performance 
(Hacker et al., 2000). For example, Hacker et al. (2000) compared the effect of prior 
performance and prior predictions on subsequent predictions. The study investigated 
predictions and outcomes of three educational psychology course exams taken 
consecutively by 99 students. Self-assessment skills were a major focus throughout 
the course. Additionally, the participants took practice multiple choice tests a week 
before the exams, which served as a basis to self-assess their strengths and 
weaknesses. Students received an answers key and textbook page numbers 
corresponding to the questions. The participants were requested to learn from their 
errors and discuss the content of the tasks with peers and the instructor. In the course 
of the actual exams, the participants made predictions about their marks before and 
after the multiple choice tests. After the first two exams, the students received their 
marks and were encouraged to use this feedback in their preparation for the third 
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exam. Hacker and colleagues hypothesised that students who had been trained to 
understand that the best predictor of future performance is their prior performance 
would increase their reliance on the feedback from past performance in making 
predictions about consecutive tests. Thus they would utilise the mnemonic cue in line 
with Koriat’s model (1997). Contrary to the hypothesis, the students did not increase 
their reliance on past performance in making predictions but rather anchored their 
judgments on previous judgments. This result suggested that student metacognitive 
beliefs may be insensitive to summary performance feedback in the form of marks. 
Hacker et al. concluded that Koriat’s (1997) findings, which support the effect of 
feedback on metacognition, cannot be generalised to more general types of feedback. 
 Conclusions as to the ineffectiveness of marks, drawn from Hacker et al. 
(2000) and Butler (1988), seem to undermine the beneficial effects of marks on 
future learning. However, it should be noted that this research was run in classroom 
settings, which has a strong applied value but which is also more open to confounds 
than controlled experimental settings. In an observational study the investigator’s 
control over a predictor variable is limited, therefore it is possible that individual 
students have different learning experiences regarding, for example, instructor 
attention, studying time outside the classroom, classroom parameters (e.g., distance 
to visual aids), and interactions between students. Further, observational settings do 
not allow for the random allocation of participants to conditions and there is no 
control group, as was the case in Hacker et al.’s study (2000). Therefore, 
substantiating these strong claims about the negligible effect of marks on 
metacognition requires support from controlled experiments that can more clearly 
elucidate the mechanisms underlying the effects. 
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In the literature, the effects of various factors on JOLs have been investigated 
mainly for item-by-item predictions, elicited for each studied item (often a word-
pair). Another category of judgments, global or aggregate JOLs, predict proportions 
of items successfully recalled from the entire list of studied items (Mazzoni & 
Nelson, 1995). Thus, global JOLs show the absolute number or percentage of items 
predicted to be recalled, whereas item-by-item JOLs represents the likelihood of a 
single item being recalled.  The recent study of Geurten and Meulemans (2017), ran 
in experimental settings, supported the notion that even general feedback can 
improve metacognitive accuracy. In that study, young primary school children were 
required to remember the target word presented with a cue word. Children in one 
condition received accurate feedback on the number of correctly remembered word-
pairs. Children in the other condition did not receive feedback. The experiment 
involved two study-recall phases with a different set of words in each phase. After 
the second study session, the children judged how many words they would 
remember. Children who received global feedback on their performance after the 
first study session had significantly better calibration than the children in the no 
feedback condition. This finding suggests that global feedback can improve global 
predictions of performance.  
The effectiveness of general feedback in improving calibration can also be 
supported indirectly from the perspective of the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic 
proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Tversky and Kahneman argued that 
people make assessments by adjusting their predictions from a point of reference. 
This psychological anchor, which initiates prediction, can be a product of the 
question formulation or a partial analysis of the task. For example, in Tversky and 
Kahneman’s (1974) experiment, the researchers asked participants to assess the 
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percentage of African countries in the United Nations. The participants were 
allocated to conditions by the spinning of a wheel of fortune which indicated initial 
values of estimation. The participants then estimated first if this value was too high 
or too low, and then provided their own estimate. For the initial values of 10 and 65 
percent, the mean estimation was 20 and 45 percent respectively. This finding 
revealed that participants anchored their estimations to the values provided, even 
though they knew that these values were provided randomly.  
Scheck and Nelson (2005) provided evidence that the anchoring effect 
explains the underconfidence with practice (UWP) effect. They argued that people 
naturally anchor their JOLs at the range between 30 and 50 percent and that the JOLs 
shift towards this anchor when the actual likelihood of recall is greater than 50 
percent. Geurten and Meulemans (2017) provided evidence that external general 
feedback can constitute a psychological anchor to which performance predictions are 
adjusted. They tested early primary school children in six conditions, feedback (or no 
feedback) and anchor (low, high, or no anchor), with eight students per cell, who 
were presented with both easy and difficult memory tasks. Children who were 
provided global feedback about their prior performance shifted their subsequent 
predictions towards the score received. The children adjusted their prediction to the 
feedback received regardless of the difficulty of their actual task. Thus, research on 
the effect of summary feedback on metacognition is far from conclusive and further 
investigation is needed. In our study, we were interested in the effect of marks, and 
the accuracy of feedback received, on student metacognition.   
The Effects of Biased Feedback 
 While the importance of understanding the feedback effect (or its absence) is 
not under question, some aspects of feedback have been under-researched. Both 
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experimental and quasi-experimental research on feedback effects on metacognition 
has focused only on accurate feedback, despite the fact that inconsistency in student 
assessment has long been an important issue for educators and students alike (Henzi, 
Davis, Jasinevicius, & Hendricson, 2006; Sadler, 2005). Inaccurate feedback may 
have multiple bases. Apart from assessment differences between individuals 
(Birenbaum, 1997), there is evidence that feedback in the form of marks can be 
unconsciously biased (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). In some situations assessors can 
also be consciously biased. For example, Dee, Dobbie, Jacob, and Rockoff (2016) 
claimed that assessors of New York’s high school exit exams, inflated 40 percent of 
marks which were just below the grade threshold and that this inflation increased the 
probability of graduation for low achievers by 27 percent. In the Australian context, 
Steenkamp and Roberts (2017) argued that institutional pressure on the student pass 
rate coupled with limited resources, at an Australian university, drive assessors to 
achieve this goal by inflating marks. Crosby and Monin (2007) pointed out that 
Black students have a lower chance than White students to receive feedback warning 
them of potential academic difficulty. They found that Caucasians are strongly 
motivated to provide information without racial prejudice, which increases the 
likelihood that they withhold discouraging, but valid, information from Black 
students. There is also evidence of the phenomenon of feedback inflation within 
educational institutions across time (Rojstaczer & Healy, 2012; Vinton & Wilke, 
2011), while Kuh and Hu (1999) also identified institutions where grade deflation 
took place over time. Despite considerable evidence of assessment distortion, the 
effect of inaccurate feedback on metacognition has not been thoroughly investigated. 
Inaccurate assessment is a serious issue because feedback distortion can diminish its 
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twofold educational goal: performance monitoring and learning facilitation (Wass, 
Van der Vleuten, Shatzer, & Jones, 2001).  
 It would be logical to assume that the effects of distorted feedback on 
metacognition would be a derivate of the effect of accurate feedback. Therefore, any 
investigation on biased feedback should be focused on the differences between the 
effects of accurate and deflated feedback and accurate and inflated feedback. It can 
be assumed that biased feedback would affect mnemonic cues (Koriat, 1997) 
similarly to accurate feedback, but that the strength of this effect would vary from the 
accurate feedback effect. The direction and the scale of this variation would be 
proportional to the direction and scale of the feedback bias. A similar mechanism 
could be justified by the anchoring-and-adjustment hypothesis (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1975), where biased feedback would establish a different reference point 
than would accurate feedback. Therefore, the biased anchor could bias the 
adjustment from this anchor. Again, the scale and the direction of this adjustment 
would be a function of the biased feedback.  
Basis of the UWP Effect 
Koriat et al. (2002) argued that the UWP effect is a particularly robust 
phenomenon which is not reversed when manipulations are applied. These 
manipulations included the mode of study time allocation (fixed and self-paced), the 
varied difficulty of items (easy and difficult), and the presence or absence of an 
incentive. The UWP was maintained even when it was attenuated with feedback 
(Koriat, 1997). Therefore, the basis of the underconfidence did not derive from the 
underassessment of previous responses.  
Koriat presented a list of possible explanations for the UWP mechanism, 
suggesting that the cue-utilisation model (1997) is amongst the most promising. 
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According to this hypothesis, in the course of repetitive study sessions, participants 
shift their basis of judgment from the task analysis to the mnemonic heuristic of past 
performance. This shift of focus towards past experience would explain why 
participants fail to fully analyse and acknowledge the effect of additional learning. 
Therefore, the progress in learning would not be reflected by a sufficient adjustment 
of JOLs.  
Interestingly, Koriat et al. (2002) admitted to making a sampling error in the 
earlier study (1997) which argued that feedback, although not averting the UWP 
effect, did reduce the UWP effect in item-by-item JOLs. Nevertheless, Koriat did not 
repeat this experiment. The current study aimed to at least partially clarify the issue 
of the effect of feedback on JOLs, extending the question from item-by-item to 
global JOLs and investigating their sensitivity to feedback.  
The Current Study 
We examined the effect of accurate feedback, in the form of marks, against a 
no-feedback control group, on both item-by-item and global JOLs. We also 
examined this effect in relation to two variations of feedback: inflated and deflated 
against an accurate feedback group.  
Participants studied 50 Swahili-English word-pairs in three study-test phases. 
Participants provided item-by-item JOLs after studying each word-pair and a global 
JOL (predicting the total percentage of words they would recall) after each study 
session. After the first and the second testing sessions, participants received feedback 
as per their condition. For the main hypothesis, we analysed the variables from phase 
2 and phase 3 of the experiment because in phase 1 the outcome could not be 
affected by feedback. The dependent variables consisted of recall accuracy, item-by-
item JOLs, global JOLs, resolution, the overconfidence/underconfidence scale and 
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the perception of feedback measure. The hypotheses involved general expectations 
related to well-grounded research on the UWP effect and novel hypotheses related to 
the effects of feedback.  
Recall performance. In line with Nelson and Dunlosky (1994), it was 
expected that recall performance would increase with every study session. We tested 
for any effects of the feedback manipulation on recall performance. However, we did 
not expect that the performance between conditions would be significantly different 
because, even if feedback affected monitoring, the fixed learning conditions did not 
allow for improvement through control over the learning process. 
Resolution. In regards to resolution (i.e., an index of metacognitive 
monitoring), we expected that participants’ item-by-item JOLs would discriminate 
between remembered and not remembered items (Ariel & Dunlosky, 2011). 
Resolution – the predictive ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect 
responses – was measured with ANDI – the Adjusted Normalized Discrimination 
Index (Yaniv, Yates, & Smith, 1991).  
The UWP effect. We expected that the experiment would replicate well-
grounded findings of the robustness of the UWP effect (Koriat et al., 2002) which, 
researchers have argued, is too strong to be fully reversed by the manipulation of 
only one factor (feedback) of the many factors which are potential bases for JOLs. 
Therefore, we hypothesised that calibration in phase 2 and in phase 3 would show 
underconfidence for both global and item-by-item JOLs in all conditions.  
Effects of feedback. The hypothesis regarding the effect of accurate 
feedback. In regards to the effect of feedback, we first examined whether feedback in 
the form of marks improves the calibration of item-by-item and global JOLs. 
Koriat’s (1997) cue-utilisation model supports this hypothesis by suggesting that 
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feedback feeds into the mnemonic cue, which is in part the basis for JOL. The notion 
that feedback improves JOL accuracy can also be derived from the anchoring-and-
adjustment heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1975), which suggests that feedback can 
serve as a starting reference point for making predictions. Empirical support for the 
beneficial effect of feedback on JOLs (Koriat, 1997) is, however, problematic given 
Koriat et al.’s (2002) admission of a possible sampling error in Koriat’s (1997) study. 
Also, Hacker et al. (2000) questioned the generalisation of Koriat’s (1997) findings 
on the effect of item-by-item feedback to the effect of marks on subsequent 
judgments. On the other hand, however, Geurten and Meulemans (2017) provided 
evidence that the positive effects of feedback on JOLs can be generalised to the 
effect of marks (scores) on subsequent global predictions.  
From the above literature review, there are theoretical arguments to support 
the effects of marks on JOLs and, in consequence, on calibration. There is also some 
empirical support for the feedback effects, although it is also possible that some of 
these results were confounded (Koriat, 1997). We argue that claims that marks have 
a null effect on metacognition are not sufficiently supported and these claims need to 
be investigated in more controlled settings than have been done to date (for example 
by Hacker et al., 2000). Therefore, we cautiously hypothesised that the provision of 
accurate marks would improve the calibration of item-by-item and global JOLs when 
compared with the no feedback condition. This improvement in calibration was 
operationalised in terms of changes in the overconfidence/underconfidence (OU) 
index (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982). The scale of the OU index ranges 
from 1 to -1, with 0 representing perfect calibration.  
Hypotheses regarding the effect of inflated and deflated feedback.  We 
extended our investigation of the effects of accurate feedback to inflated and deflated 
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feedback. Specifically, we hypothesised that inflated feedback can increase item-by-
item and global JOL calibration and that deflated feedback can decrease both types 
of JOL accuracy when compared with the effect of accurate feedback on JOLs. This 
effect is also operationalised in terms of the OU index. Koriat (1997) argued that 
performance on earlier tasks is a valid predictor of JOLs. Therefore, we proposed an 
extension of Koriat’s cue-utilisation hypothesis to argue that biased feedback in the 
form of marks would predict biased JOLs. Thus, we assumed that the direction of 
biased marks (inflated, deflated) would predict the direction of bias for JOL 
accuracy. This hypothesis was also supported by the potential anchoring effect of 
feedback (Geurten & Meulemans, 2017).  
We expected the manipulation to produce similar effects for both item-by-
item and global JOLs because the basis of both types of JOLs can be explained by 
the same cue-utilisation model (Koriat, 1997).  However, within the same model, it is 
also possible that item-by-item and global JOLs vary in sensitivity to marks. It could 
be speculated that general feedback in the forms of marks would also create theory-
based cues (related to general belief about one’s skills), aside from experience-based 
cues (related to learning of particular items). Therefore, it is possible that global 
JOLs, which produce general judgment, would utilise general feedback (theory-based 
cue) more than item-by-item JOLs. Hence, the effect of marks may be more 
pronounced for global JOLs than for item-by-item JOLs.  
The final examination in the study was a perception of feedback test which 
investigated the extent of alignment between a participant’s expectations of marks 
and the actual marks received. This measure was designed to provide additional 
insight into the study outcomes. This hypothesis is exploratory in nature and, 
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therefore, we looked for significant differences between conditions. The strength of 
differences between conditions, however, was difficult to anticipate.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
 The participants comprised 80 adults (31 males, Mage = 29.61 years, SD = 
12.76). Participants received either $15 compensation for their time or one-hour 
research participation credit (1st-year Psychology students at UTAS). A reward of 
$200 was drawn from amongst the best 10 performers to facilitate recruitment and 
participant engagement. Participants were recruited by email, from the Psychology 
Research Participants Pool, or from advertisements around campus. The sample 
comprised domestic and international students. The only exclusion criterion was 
experience learning Swahili (because the task involved learning Swahili-English 
word-pairs). No participants were excluded based on this criterion. The data of one 
participant were excluded for non-engagement in the task (the same two non-task 
related words were used in most of the 3x50 recall trials, and all JOLs were at 50 
percent). Another participant was not able to finalise the task due to IT 
complications. Participants were randomly assigned to four conditions with 20 
participants per cell.  
The study used a 4 x 2 (3) mixed factorial design. The between-subject factor 
was the type of feedback received after the first and the second testing sessions: no 
feedback (1); accurate feedback (2); feedback inflated by 32 percent of the actual 
score (3); feedback deflated by 32 percent of the actual score (4). The within-subjects 
factors were phases of learning and testing (2 and 3).  
The dependent variables included: item-by-item JOL magnitude (on a scale 
of 0 to 100) and global JOL magnitude (on a scale of 0 to 100); recall performance; 
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calibration between JOLs and performance expressed in the directional OU index 
(Lichtenstein et al., 1982). On this scale, ranging from -1 to 1, 0 represents a perfect 
match between recall and JOLs. Values above 0 indicate overconfidence and values 
below 0  indicate underconfidence. The OU measure for item-by-item JOLs was 
calculated as a mean of the OU values at each level of JOL. For global JOLs the OU 
measure reflects the averaged ratio of global JOLs and recall. Resolution was 
expressed in ANDI – the Adjusted Normalized Discrimination Index (Yaniv et al., 
1991) which ranges between 0 (no discrimination) and 1 (perfect discrimination). A 
perception of feedback check was measured on a scale from 1 (feedback was lower 
than predictions) to 10 (feedback was higher than predictions) where 5 represented a 
match between predictions and feedback.  
Materials  
 The entire experiment was run on a computer with software prepared by the 
Software Engineer for the Tasmanian Cognition Laboratory. The software used Jaro–
Winkler distance (Winkler, 1990) to detect and accept answers with simple spelling 
errors. The experiment used 55 items (see Appendix 1) from a pool of  100 Swahili-
English word-pairs developed by Nelson and Dunlosky (1994). One item was used 
for a practice session and four items were used as primacy buffers and excluded from 
the analysis. The remaining 50 word-pairs were selected for learning and testing 
sessions. According to norms developed by Nelson and Dunlosky the mean recall for 
the pool of the 100 word-pairs was 0.14 (SD = 0.10) in phase 1, 0.42 (SD = 0.16) in 
phase 2, and 0.63 (SD = 0.14) in phase 3. The mean recall for the 50 selected items 
was .20, .50, .69 respectively. SDs for the selection was not available, therefore we 
used the pool SD from phase 2 as a reference point for feedback manipulation.  
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Procedure 
The procedure followed that applied by Nelson and Dunlosky (1994). As the 
participants arrived they read the information sheet and signed a consent form. All 
instructions regarding the experiment were displayed on a computer screen. A one-
item practice session preceded the experiment. The researcher was available for any 
enquires throughout the experiment.  The experiment, in all conditions, involved 
three cycles. Every cycle comprised a learning phase followed by a testing phase. 
The learning phase involved 54 English-Swahili word-pairs which were displayed on 
a computer screen for 10 seconds each. The first four word-pairs were a primacy 
buffer and were not included in the practice session. Participants provided item-by-
item JOLs after studying each word-pair and predicted the total percentage of words 
they would recall after each study session (global JOL). In the testing phase, the 
participants were presented with a Swahili cue word, after which they typed the 
target word and clicked continue. Information was displayed on the computer screen 
indicating that the participant had 15 seconds to accomplish the task. When the time 
expired another cue word appeared automatically on the screen. At the end of the 
experiment, as a perception of feedback check, the participants assessed whether the 
feedback received matched their predictions. 
Results 
General Findings 
Before addressing the main question regarding the effect of feedback on 
underconfidence for item-by-item and global JOLs, more general findings are 
reported. 
Data Screening. The design of the study prevented the possibility of missing 
data. All data were screened for outliers, with some mild outliers identified and 
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removed. The data pattern did not change following outlier removal, therefore the 
original values were reported, with the exception for ANDI data, where outliers were 
permanently removed. The normality of the data was inspected with the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests in conjunction with Q-Q plots, 
histograms and skewness and kurtosis measures as advised by Field (2013). The 
inspection revealed that the data were skewed, and a square root transformation and a 
reverse score transformation was applied to correct this skew. However, as the 
pattern of results based on the transformed data was identical to that for the original 
data, raw data are reported. The highest values of the skew were related to phase 1 of 
the experiment which was not tested in regards to the main hypotheses, therefore it 
was assumed that the robustness of ANOVA (Schmider, Ziegler, Danay, Beyer, & 
Bühner, 2010) and the relatively low skew values would be sufficient to deliver 
reliable results for the main analysis. Levene’s tests in all but one (remediated with 
the Brown-Forsythe test) of the following analyses revealed linearity of the data. A 
single violation of data homoscedasticity was corrected with the Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction. Both corrections were noted below.  
 Demographics. Two one-way ANOVAs revealed that there were no age 
differences between groups: F (3, 76) = 0.80, p = .497, ηp² = .03, and that males and 
females were similarly distributed  F (3, 76) = 0.46, p = .712, ηp² = .02. 
Recall performance. We tested for  any effects of the feedback manipulation 
on recall performance. A two-way 4 (feedback condition) x 3 (phase) mixed 
ANOVA, with Greenhouse-Geisser correction, revealed that there was no significant 
main effect of condition on the recall performance, F (3, 76) = 0.37, p = .773, ηp² 
=.02. The interaction of condition and study phase was also non-significant, F (4.85, 
122.73) = 0.56, p = .727, ηp² = .02. In line with our prediction, the main effect of 
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study phase on recall performance was significant, F (1.62, 122.73) = 715.01, p < 
.001, ηp² = .90. Two within-subjects t-tests with a Bonferroni correction (to  p < .025) 
revealed a significant increase in recall between phase 1 (M = .24, SD = .17) and 
phase 2 (M = .54, SD = .24), t (79) = 23.56, p < .001, 95% CI [.28, .33], d = 2.34, and 
between phase 2 and phase 3 (M = .71, SD = .22), t (79) = 18.17, p < .001, 95% CI 
[.15, .19], d = 1.45.  
Resolution. We hypothesised that participants would be able to discriminate 
between items that they would and would not remember (i.e., based on item-by-item 
JOLs). However, we made no prediction about the effect of the feedback 
manipulation on resolution. JOLs predicted recall in all phases, as one-sample t-test 
revealed that overall ANDI in phase 1 (M = .19, SD = .20) was significantly above 
zero, t (79) = 8.54, p < .001, 95% CI [.14, .23], with a large effect size d = 0.95. 
Thus, in line with the hypothesis, the participants were able to discriminate between 
items they would and would not remember. A 4 (feedback condition) x 2 (phase 2 
and 3) mixed ANOVA, revealed a non-significant main effect of condition on ANDI, 
F (3, 72) = 0.26, p = .853, ηp² = .01. Further, the interaction of condition and study 
phase for global JOLs was non-significant, F (3, 72) = 1.98, p = .125, ηp² = .08. 
Thus, there was no evidence that the feedback manipulation affected resolution. 
Overall ANDI between phase 2 (M = .21, SD = .17) and phase 3 (M = .29, SD = .23) 
increased significantly, F (3, 72) = 9.35, p = .003, ηp² = .12. 
The UWP effect. We expected to see the UWP effect for both item-by-item 
and global JOLs. An inspection of calibration graphs (Figure 1) for item-by-item 
JOLs (plotting variations in recall as a function of JOL magnitude) reveals the typical 
UWP effect for all conditions. Participants typically showed overconfidence in phase 
1 and underconfidence in phases 2 and 3. The UWP effect was also observed on the  
THE EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK    25 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Calibration curves between the correctly recalled items and the 
item-by-item JOLs for: no feedback (A); accurate feedback (B); inflated 
feedback (C); and deflated feedback (D) groups. The error bars show 
standard errors. The diagonal line represents perfect calibration. Data placed 
below the diagonal line show overconfidence, or underconfidence when 
located above the diagonal line.  
 
OU index for global JOLs. A within-samples t-test revealed that, in line with the 
hypothesis, in the first phase of the experiment, when all the groups received the 
same treatment, global JOLs (M = 36.50, SD = 18.56) were significantly higher than 
recall accuracy (M = 23.93, SD = 16.72), t (79) = 6.31, p < .001, 95% CI [8.61, 
16.53], d = 1.42, indicating overconfidence. In phases 2 and 3 (i.e., following 
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exposure to the feedback manipulation), mean recall exceeded mean global JOLs 
(see Figure 3), indicating underconfidence. However, underconfidence was not 
significant for accurate and inflated feedback as 95% CI for global JOLs and recall 
accuracy overlapped for these conditions. Therefore, UPW effect for global JOLs 
was significant only for deflated feedback and partially (no effect in phase 2) for the 
accurate feedback condition.   
Effects of Feedback 
 We hypothesised that accurate feedback would increase the accuracy of item-
by-item and global JOLs, compared to the no feedback group. We also expected that 
inflated feedback would moderate underconfidence more than accurate feedback for 
item-by-item and global JOLs, because higher/lower feedback would potentially 
provide a higher/lower reference point which would be used as a cue in probability 
predictions. Finally, we expected that deflated feedback would increase 
underconfidence when compared with the effect of accurate feedback for both types 
of JOLs. We report the investigation of these hypotheses separately for item-by-item 
and global JOLs. The effects of feedback analysis involved only phase 2 and phase 3 
of the experiment, as the phase 1 results reflect performance prior to the feedback 
manipulation.  
Item-by-item JOLs. A 4 (feedback condition) x 2 (phase 2 and 3) mixed 
ANOVA revealed, contrary to the hypothesis, that there was no significant main 
effect of condition on item-by-item JOL magnitude, F (3, 76) = 0.22, p = .886, ηp² = 
.01. The interaction between condition and study phase for item-by-item JOLs was 
also non-significant, F (3, 76) = 0.46, p = .710, ηp² = .02. The main effect of the 
study phase on item-by-item JOLs was significant, F (3, 76) = 159.61, p < .001, ηp² = 
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.68. The pattern presented in Figure 2 revealed that the mean item-by-item JOL 
increased with every study phase in all conditions, as did recall accuracy.  
 
 
Figure 2. Overall magnitudes for item-by-item JOLs and accurate recall. The 
error bars show standard errors.  
 
The OU index for item-by-item JOLs. A two-way 4 (feedback condition) x 
2 (phase) mixed ANOVA revealed that, contrary to the hypothesis, the main effect of 
feedback on the level of underconfidence was non-significant, F (3, 76) = 0.61, p = 
.609, ηp² = .02, for item-by-item JOLs. Also, the interaction of phase and condition 
was not significant F (3, 76) = 0.58, p = .632, ηp² = .02. The effect of phase was also 
not significant, F (1, 76) = 0.18, p = .672, ηp² < .01. Thus, although participants 
typically shifted from over to underconfidence from phase 1 to phase 2, there was no 
evidence of any difference between phase 2 and phase 3.  
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Global JOLs. A two-way 4 (feedback condition) x 2 (phase) mixed ANOVA 
revealed, contrary to the hypothesis, that the main effect of condition on global JOLs 
was not significant, F (3, 76) = 1.89, p = .139, ηp² = .07. However, the interaction of 
condition and study phase for global JOLs was significant, F (3, 76) = 3.36, p = .023, 
ηp² = .12.  A follow-up test of simple effects revealed that there was a significant 
main effect of condition, F (1, 76) = 1.47, p = .035, in phase 2 (despite not being 
detected by the mixed ANOVA), but not in phase 3, F (1, 76) = 1.47, p = .231. A 
one-way ANOVA for phase 2 confirmed a significant main effect of condition F (1, 
76) = 3.01, p = .035, ηp² = .11. A post hoc Tukey test revealed that global JOLs for 
deflated feedback (M = 24.00, SD = 13.92) were lower (p = .023) than global JOLs 
for the no feedback condition (M = 44.00, SD = 23.71). However, we treated this 
result with caution because Levene’s test for the ANOVA was significant F (3, 76) = 
2.75, p = .049. Therefore, the Brown-Forsythe test was used, which confirmed the 
significant main effect of condition in phase 2, F (3, 68.20) = 3.01, p = .036. We 
followed with an independent t-test which, in line with the hypothesis, supported the 
Tukey test results that global JOLs for deflated feedback were significantly lower 
than for the no feedback condition t (38) = 3.25, p = .002, 95% CI [7.56, 32.45], d = 
1.03, in phase 2. 
The main effect of the study phase on global JOLs was significant, F (3, 76) 
= 69.74, p < .001, ηp² = .48. An inspection of the graphs in Figure 3 revealed that 
mean global JOLs increased significantly between phase 2 and phase 3 for accurate 
and inflated conditions (moderate overlap of 95% CI) and deflated conditions (no 
overlap). However, this increase seemed not significant for the no feedback condition 
as 95% CI overlapped more than moderately for this condition (Field, 2013). 
 
THE EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK    29 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of the means of correctly recalled items and of the 
means of global JOLs. The error bars show 95% CIs. 
 
The OU index for global JOLs.  A two-way 4 (feedback condition) x 2 
(phase) mixed ANOVA revealed that the main effect of feedback on the level of 
underconfidence was significant F (3, 76) = 4.49, p = .006, ηp² = .15, suggesting that 
the provision of feedback made a difference in the OU index for at least one of the 
four levels of feedback The main effect of phase on the level of underconfidence for 
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global JOLs was not significant F (1, 76) = 0.16, p = .692, ηp² < .01. This effect 
revealed that the OU index was not influenced by repeated learning. The interaction 
of phase and condition was significant F (3, 76) = 3.23, p = .027, ηp² = .11. This 
interaction effect indicated that the effects of feedback on the OU Index, between 
four levels of feedback, were different in phase 2 and in phase 3. To break down this 
interaction we ran a follow-up test of simple effects of condition within two levels of 
phase which revealed that there was a significant difference between groups in phase 
2, F (3.76) = 2.92, p = .039,  and also in phase 3, F (3.76) = 5.03, p = .003.  
Effect of accurate feedback. A follow-up series of six independent-samples 
t-tests (see Table 1) was conducted to test the hypothesised effects of accurate 
feedback (compared to no feedback, inflated feedback, or deflated feedback) on 
underconfidence. In phase 2, contrary to the hypothesis, there was no significant 
difference between the group which received accurate feedback and the group 
without feedback. In phase 3, in line with the hypothesis, a similar medium effect 
size was observed in the reversed direction. Although these comparisons returned 
non-significant results, the effect sizes for differences exceeded the cut-off for a 
medium effect. These comparisons may, therefore, suffer from a lack of power. The 
effect sizes may suggest a genuine difference, but need to be interpreted with 
caution.   
Effect of biased feedback. A cycle of t-tests (see Table 1) revealed, contrary 
to the hypothesis, that in phase 2 the levels of underconfidence were nearly identical 
for accurate and inflated feedback, whereas in phase 3 the difference was not 
significant and the effect size was trivial. Contrary to the hypothesis, the difference 
between accurate feedback and deflated feedback in phase 2 was not significant, but  
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Table 1 
Effect of Feedback on the OU Index for Global JOLs 
Pairwise Comparisons 
No 
Feedback 
Accurate 
Feedback 
Inflated 
Feedback 
Deflated 
Feedback t (38) p 95% CI d 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Phase 2 
No Feedback – Accurate Feedback -.12 (.19) -.21 (.12)   1.68 .101 [-.02; .19] 0.53 
Accurate Feedback – Inflated Feedback  -.21 (.12) -.21 (.16)  0.05 .964 [-.09; .09] 0.01 
Accurate Feedback – Deflated Feedback  -.21 (.12)  -.26 (.15) 1.44 .159 [-.03; .15] 0.38 
Phase 3 
No Feedback – Accurate Feedback -.25 (.17) -.16 (.12)   1.77 .085 [-.18; .01] 0.56 
Accurate Feedback – Inflated Feedback  -.16 (.12) -.14 (.16)  0.42 .675 [-.11; .07] 0.13 
Accurate Feedback – Deflated Feedback  -.16 (.12)  -.29 (.10) 3.68  .001* [.06; .20] 1.16 
Note. For all groups n =20. A Bonferroni correction (.05/6) was used to establish t-tests significance level at p < .008*.  
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the effect size was medium, indicating some possibility that deflated feedback 
deepened underconfidence. In phase 3, in line with the hypothesis, deflated feedback 
significantly increased underconfidence, when compared with the accurate feedback 
condition. The effect size of this difference was large. An inspection of the graph 
(see Figure 3) comparing the differences between recall accuracy and global JOLs 
seemed to suggest that the significant effect of deflated feedback on underconfidence 
was rather due to lowered global JOLs than to reduced recall.   
 Perception of feedback. A one-way between groups ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect, F (2, 57) = 4.86, p = .011, ηp² = .15,  of condition on 
perception of feedback. Follow up one-sample t-tests, with the Bonferroni corrected 
significance level of p < .013, revealed that for participants who received deflated 
feedback (M = 5.05, SD = 1.67) this feedback matched their expectations because the 
difference from the matched expectation point of 5 was not significant, t (19) = 0.13, 
p = .895, d = 0.03, 95% CI [-.73, .83] and the effect size was trivial. However, 
participants in both the accurate (M = 6.70, SD = 2.11) and inflated feedback (M = 
6.80, SD = 2.17) conditions indicated that the feedback received was significantly 
higher than the match point, t (19) = 3.61, p = .002, d = 0.81, 95% CI [.71, 2.69]  and 
t (19) = 3.72, p = .001, d = 0.83, 95% CI [.79, 2.81], for the accurate and inflated 
feedback conditions, respectively. An independent samples t-test revealed that there 
was no significant difference between the accurate and inflated feedback conditions, 
t (38) = 0.15, p = .883, 95% CI [-1.47, 1.28], d = 0.05, therefore their perception of 
feedback was equally higher than expected.  
Discussion 
 The current study investigated the effects of accurate and inaccurate 
feedback, in the form of marks, on item-by-item and global JOLs. The first main 
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hypothesis of the current study concerned the effect of feedback in the form of marks 
on the accuracy (OU) of item-by-item and global JOLs. We hypothesised that 
providing marks would increase the accuracy (OU) of both types of JOLs. The 
results do not fully support this hypothesis. However, medium effect sizes suggest 
that the expected effect could be significant with increased power. Secondly, we 
expected that inflated feedback would moderate underconfidence and that deflated 
feedback would aggravate underconfidence when compared with accurate feedback. 
The results partially support the second hypothesis. Interestingly, the results show 
divergent patterns for item-for-item JOLs and global JOLs.  
Effects of Marks 
 The results reveal that the provision of marks, whether accurate, deflated or 
inflated, did not affect participants’ recall performance. Feedback also did not affect 
resolution. Neither did we find evidence that participants incorporated feedback into 
item-by-item JOLs. The indifference of marks on these results was mirrored by the 
lack of feedback effects on levels of underconfidence. Therefore, contrary to the 
hypothesis, these results do not support the notion that the effects of concrete 
feedback (Koriat, 1997) can be generalised to the effects of marks. The failure of this 
generalisation is in line with Hacker et al. (2000). Thus, marks do not seem to 
improve student metacognitive assessment. The participants also discounted accurate 
and biased feedback in making their item-by-item JOLs. Therefore the expectation 
that biased marks feed into mnemonic cues as an experience related heuristic (Koriat, 
1997) is not supported for item-by-item JOLs. 
 The effects of marks on global JOL accuracy is more complex. The 
differences between the accurate feedback and no feedback conditions were non-
significant. However, medium effect sizes for these effects were observed in phase 2 
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and phase 3. Therefore, with a larger sample size, increased power would increase 
the chance of observing significant effects. The direction of the observed effect size 
in phase 2 is puzzling because it indicates that the accurate feedback condition 
generates higher underconfidence than the no feedback condition. However, in phase 
3 the direction of this effect was the opposite and in line with the hypothesis. These 
inconclusive results did not fully support the findings of Geurten and Meulemans 
(2017) that global feedback improves calibration for global JOLs.  
The most interesting results emerged in the effects of biased marks on global 
JOLs. Whereas students treated inflated feedback in a similar manner as accurate 
feedback in phase 2 and 3 (i.e., showing reduced underconfidence), deflated 
feedback significantly increased underconfidence when compared with accurate 
feedback in phase 3. This effect size was large, providing strong evidence that the 
negative bias in assessment increased underconfidence for global JOLs. In the 
previous phase (2) this difference was non-significant, however, the medium effect 
size suggested that with a larger sample size deflated feedback may generate 
significantly higher underconfidence than accurate feedback. The unique sensitivity 
of the participants to deflated feedback suggested that negatively biased marks 
compounded participants’ general tendency to undervalue learning across trials (i.e., 
the mechanism typically thought to underlie the UWP effect). This effect is at least 
partially consistent with the cue-utilisation hypothesis (Koriat, 1997). Interestingly, 
accurate and inflated feedback seemed to neutralise the UWP effect for global JOLs, 
in contrast to the findings on the robustness of the UWP effect (Koriat et al., 2002).  
The different effect of negatively biased marks on global JOLs, in contrast to 
the effects of accurate and positively biased marks, was also supported by the 
perception of feedback check. This measure indicates that participants perceived 
THE EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK   35 
   
 
 
 
deflated feedback as almost ideally matching their expectations, whereas the accurate 
and inflated feedback considerably exceeded expectations. The finding that deflated 
feedback perfectly matched the assessment expectations suggested that negatively 
biased marks were seen as fully credible, whereas both inflated and deflated marks 
were seen equally, as largely overestimated. The perception of feedback check was a 
novel way to measure a third-order cognition and supported the outcome of the 
metacognitive predictions. The participants’ acceptance of negatively biased 
feedback as an expected outcome provides further insight into the UWP effect 
suggesting fundamental underconfidence in repeated learning tasks. It seems that 
people not only tend to discount the effects of learning, but they are more willing to 
accept information confirming their biased assessment than more realistic feedback. 
The difference between effects of marks for item-by-item JOLs (no effects) 
and global JOLs (mixed effects) suggests that the basis for these two types of 
judgments is not the same. These different effects may be explained by a potential 
difference in the relative contribution of theory-based cues and experience-based 
cues to two types of JOL. According to Koriat (1997; 2007) theory-based cues 
generate judgements which are based on one’s beliefs, for example in one’s learning 
capacities. Koriat further argued that experienced-based cues influence judgments 
related to the learning experience, for example how difficult items are. The results of 
this study suggest that it is possible that marks have a stronger influence on theory-
based cues (i.e.: beliefs in one’s capabilities) than on experienced-based cues (i.e.: 
perception of learning efficiency). This may be because marks provide a summary 
score which is not related to a concrete item. Such summary feedback can be 
understood as the assessment of general skills, not as mere learning feedback. 
Therefore if global JOLs are more strongly based on theory-based cues than item-by-
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item JOLs, and if marks feed primarily these theory-based cues, marks would yield 
stronger effects on global JOLs than item-by-item JOLs. Conversely, if item-by-item 
JOLs are more strongly affected by experienced-based cues, the relative weakness of 
these cues, in the provision of marks, would explain the indifference of participants 
to marks in JOLs generated for a concrete item.  
The availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) also suggests that the 
effect of marks would be more pronounced for global JOLs than for item-by-item 
JOLs, because when formulating global JOLs the memory of past marks seems more 
available than the sum of likely remembered items, whereas for item-for-item JOLs 
the memory of the last item seems more available than past marks. 
This study successfully replicated other well-grounded phenomena related to 
JOLs: increased performance and JOLs with study phase; and partially, the UWP 
effect. Therefore, the conclusions derived from the novel hypotheses are additionally 
supported by the reliability of the overall design, which provided expected results in 
a number of key domains.  
Implications and Follow-Up Studies  
One implication of the study to educational practice is that marks alone are 
not helpful in the learning of particular items. For example, the lack of feedback 
effect on item level JOLs could suggest that if students receive only marks or grades 
after a test or exam, this information would not contribute to their metacognitive 
insight when learning particular information for a subsequent test or exam. 
Therefore, teachers and tutors need to rely on other ways of communicating progress 
to improve student metacognition. Follow-up studies could investigate the effects of 
other, more concrete and comprehensive types of feedback, to broaden the 
knowledge in the area already explored for example by Butler et al. (2008). It should 
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be remembered, however, that such generalisations of experimental effects to more 
naturalistic settings have limited validity (Cassidy, 2013).   
Marks have some potential to affect students’ global perceptions of their 
knowledge and/or ability. The significance and the direction of the effect of accurate 
marks on these global self-assessments have not been fully clarified in the present 
study; therefore, further studies with larger sample sizes would be needed. Such 
investigation has the potential to provide additional insight into the mechanism of 
academic self-efficacy – belief in one’s academic capacity (Bandura, Barbaranelli, 
Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996), as is discussed below. 
The current study, however, showed strong and clear effects of deflated 
marks on general predictions. This may suggest that students pay particular attention 
to lowered marks and, mistakenly, they treat this understated assessment as more 
valid than accurate feedback. The implication of this finding may be that deflated 
marks affect student general self-assessment more profoundly than other types of 
feedback. This raises the question whether the effects of negatively biased marks on 
global JOLs can be generalised to negative effects on academic self-efficacy. Direct 
testing of this assumptions is not ethically acceptable because it would require the 
provision of biased academic results. Therefore, it could be only indirectly implied 
that negatively biased feedback may lead to lowered academic self-efficacy. This 
implication can be grounded in the finding that in the course of the semester 
academic self-efficacy decreases for students who receive low marks and it increases 
for high achievers (Zusho, Pintrich, & Coppola, 2003). If this assumption is correct, 
it would mean that deflated feedback could lead to negative effects of low academic 
self-efficacy such as lowered levels of goal settings and, in consequence, lowered 
engagement in learning (Zimmerman, Bandura, & Martinez-Pons, 1992). Also, the 
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studies investigating theories of intelligence has found that students with low levels 
of self-efficacy believe that intelligence is innate – that it cannot be improved by 
studying – and that such students cannot effectively control their studying 
(Komarraju & Nadler, 2013). Thus, it could be implied that negatively biased 
feedback, through its negative effect on self-efficacy, may trigger a self-fulfilling 
prophecy – a Pygmalion effect in reverse (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968).  
Limitations 
The current study is not free from limitations, the most important being 
insufficient power. It would seem that the sample size used, the power determinant, 
is sufficient for the replication of strong effects such as the UWP effect (Koriat et al., 
2002). However, the hypothesis was related to much more subtle inferences – the 
difference in the UWP effect strength between groups. Therefore the group sample 
should have been significantly larger as the sought effect was more subtle (Rosenthal 
& Rosnow, 1991). Also, the hypothesised effects involved between-groups 
comparisons which in itself requires higher power than within-subject designs 
(Maxwell, Kelley, & Rausch, 2008). The power limitations did not allow for more 
detailed comparisons, which would require splitting the number of participants per 
group in half, for example, for high and low performers, and for easy and difficult 
items. Such comparisons would be possible in future studies with increased power.  
Conclusion 
 The current study investigated the effects of accurate and biased marks on 
item-by-item and global JOLs. Although students did not seem to incorporate marks 
in their item-by-item JOLs, this summary feedback has some potential to affect 
global perceptions of ability. It seems that students are particularly vulnerable to 
deflated feedback, which makes them assess their general recall abilities as much 
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lower than students who received accurate or inflated feedback. This finding implies 
that students who receive negatively biased marks may have a lowered assessment of 
their skills, which can potentially lead to lower motivation and decreased 
engagement with learning. This finding highlights the possibility that overly harsh 
testing standards can be counterproductive. The effect of inflated and accurate marks 
on global JOLs has not been fully clarified and the emerging effect sizes encourage 
future studies in this direction. Such studies should have larger sample sizes to 
increase power.  
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